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            The author mentioned something about moral tradition which developed the concept of rights, autonomy and justice is the same tradition that provided justifications The author mentioned that there is a clear difference between saying that someone has a right to do something in this sense and saying that it is the right thing for him to do or that he does no wrong in doing it. Someone may have the right to do something that is wrong for him to do.

            It was said that conservatives and liberals do agree that sometimes a man does not do the wrong thing to break a law, when his conscience so requires. 

            I think that in this chapter it points out that one must know their rights. And not everything that is for us will do well for us is a right thing to do. Sometimes things that we think that is right for us are not always right in the eyes of many. We should do right things based on what is right for many and not just what will benefit us.

Justice as fairness said by the author begins. He said with one of the most general of all choices which person might make together. Our social situation is just if it is such that by this sequence of hypothetical agreements we would have contracted into the general system of rules which defines it.

            He also said that in working out the conception of justice as fairness one main task clearly is to determine which principles of justice would be chosen in the original position.  One feature of justice as fairness is to think of the parties in the initial situation as rational and mutually disinterested.

            The author said also that it is clear for her that the best moral theory has to be a cooperative product of women and men, has to harmonize justice and care.

Justice as fairness said by the author begins. He said with one of the most general of all choices which person might make together. Our social situation is just if it is such that by this sequence of hypothetical agreements we would have contracted into the general system of rules which defines it.

            He also said that in working out the conception of justice as fairness one main task clearly is to determine which principles of justice would be chosen in the original position.  One feature of justice as fairness is to think of the parties in the initial situation as rational and mutually disinterested.

            The author said also that justice as fairness is not a complete contract theory. Obviously if justice as fairness succeeds reasonably well, a next step would be to study the more general view suggested by the name rightness as fairness.

            John Rawls mentioned about two principles of justice. First, he said that each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage and attached to positions an offices open to all.

The author mentioned that there is a clear difference between saying that someone has a right to do something in this sense and saying that it is the right thing for him to do or that he does no wrong in doing it. Someone may have the right to do something that is wrong for him to do.

            It was said that conservatives and liberals do agree that sometimes a man does not do the wrong thing to break a law, when his conscience so requires. 

            I think that in this chapter it points out that one must know their rights. And not everything that is for us will do well for us is a right thing to do. Sometimes things that we think that is right for us are not always right in the eyes of many. We should do right things based on what is right for many and not just what will benefit us.

The author mentioned that there is a clear difference between saying that someone has a right to do something in this sense and saying that it is the right thing for him to do or that he does no wrong in doing it. Someone may have the right to do something that is wrong for him to do.

            It was said that conservatives and liberals do agree that sometimes a man does not do the wrong thing to break a law, when his conscience so requires. 

            I think that in this chapter it points out that one must know their rights. And not everything that is for us will do well for us is a right thing to do. Sometimes things that we think that is right for us are not always right in the eyes of many. We should do right things based on what is right for many and not just what will benefit us.

            The author mentioned something also about organized labor, even this picture he said is now archaic.  He also said that claiming that one has a right is another sort of thing once can do with language. He also mentioned that if there conceivable circumstances in which one would admit rights differently there is no doubt that their characteristic use and that for which they are distinctively well suited.

The author mentioned that there is a clear difference between saying that someone has a right to do something in this sense and saying that it is the right thing for him to do or that he does no wrong in doing it. Someone may have the right to do something that is wrong for him to do.

            It was said that conservatives and liberals do agree that sometimes a man does not do the wrong thing to break a law, when his conscience so requires. 

            I think that in this chapter it points out that one must know their rights. And not everything that is for us will do well for us is a right thing to do. Sometimes things that we think that is right for us are not always right in the eyes of many. We should do right things based on what is right for many and not just what will benefit us.

            The author mentioned something also about organized labor, even this picture he said is now archaic.  He also said that claiming that one has a right is another sort of thing once can do with language. He also mentioned that if there conceivable circumstances in which one would admit rights differently there is no doubt that their characteristic use and that for which they are distinctively well suited.

According to Aristotle, happiness is not pleasure, honour, or wealth. Happiness by his definition is related to virtue because based on what Aristotle said happiness is an activity of the soul with accordance with virtue. Aristotle mentioned that happiness by his definition is related to virtue. He also pointed out the two kinds of Virtue: Moral and Intellectual. He mentioned that moral virtue comes from training and habit. Also, he said that moral virtue is a state of character that is a mean between the vices of excess and deficiency. In the other hand, Aristotle defined intellectual virtue as the most perfect happiness and is found in the activity of reason or contemplation. Happiness is related to pleasure in the sense that based on what Aristotle said that most men seem to identify happiness with pleasure that is why they love the life of enjoyment.

He said that moral virtue comes from training and habit. He pointed out also that moral virtue is a state of character that is a mean between the vices of excess and deficiency. In example to that is courage as a mean between the extremes of rashness and cowardice.

Based on how I understand the content, I think it is possible for everyone in our society to be happy. Everyone can be happy but to what happiness is differs depending on the aspect that a certain person finds fulfilment. In example to that, for some pleasure can be a form of happiness while for others it may be honour or wealth. There are a lot of reasons for a person to be happy and every person has different views about their own happiness.

The author mentioned something about, good will. It is said that it is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement and any other talents of the mind we may care to name of courage, resolution and constancy of purpose, as qualities of temperament are without a doubt good and desirable in many respects.

            A good will said to be not good because of what is effects or accomplishes because of its fitness for attaining some proposed end. Also, it was stated that, the moral worth of an action does not depend on the result expected from it and so too does not depend on any principle of action that needs to borrow its motive from this expected result.

            This chapter mentioned also that if all imperatives of duty can be derived from this one imperative as their principle, then even although we leave it unsettled whether what we call duty may not be an empty concept, we shall still be able to show at least what we understand by ti and what the concept means.

            The author pointed out also that the will is conceived as a power of determining oneself to action in accordance with the idea of certain laws. He also mentioned something about the practical imperative will therefore be as follows: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end.

The author said that the right actions are those that produce the greatest possible balance of happiness over unhappiness.

            Is happiness the only thing that matters? This is the one of the questions asked in this chapter. Right actions are the ones that produce the most good. But then again this chapter asks what is good? The classical utilitarian reply is: one thing and one thing only, happiness. The idea that happiness is the one ultimate good is knows as Hedonism. It has always been an attractive theory because of its beautiful simplicity, and because it expresses the intuitively plausible notion that things are good or bad only on account of the way they makes us feel.

            This chapter mentioned also that Hedonism misunderstands the nature of happiness. Happiness is said that is not recognized as good. Instead, happiness is said to be a response of what we have to the attainment of things.

            Utilitarianism says that actions are defensible if they produce a favourable balance of happiness over unhappiness. Utilitarianism is said to be in some form, true.

            This chapter mentioned something about the line of defense. The first line of defense is pointing out that the examples used in antiutilitarian arguments are unrealistic and do not describe situations that come up in the real world. The second line of defense talks about how utilitarian comes into conflict with common sense. The second line of defense points out all this and proposes to save utilitarianism by giving it a new formulation. The last line of defense, the author said that admittedly utilitarianism does have consequences which are incompatible with the common moral consciousness. Our moral common sense is after all not necessarily reliable.

            Act-utilitarianism is a perfectly defensible doctrine and does not need to be modified. Rule-utilitarianism, by contrast, is an unnecessarily watered-down version of the theory, which gives rules a greater importance that they merit.

The author said that if he is asked what he means by different quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, except its being greater in amount. There is but one possible he said. Of there be one to which all or almost all who have irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure.

            The author said something according to the Greatest Happiness Principle, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable, is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity being the preference felt by those who in their opportunities experience to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation.

            He also said that to do as you would be done by and to love your neighbor as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness or the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole

            The author did mention also that what was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of happiness has come to be desired for its own sake. Being desired for its own sake it is, desired as part of happiness. The person is made, or thinks he would be made, happy by its mere possession and is made unhappy by failure to obtain it.

            Virtue according to the utilitarian conception is a good of this description. The utilitarian standard tolerates and approves those other acquired desires, up to the point beyond which they would be more injurious to the general happiness than promotive of it.

            The authors own impression is that she believes that outsiders can in principle deliver perfectly good indictments. She mentioned something about how moral isolationism forbids us to form any opinions on these matters. Its ground for doing so is that we don’t understand them. Our efforts to do so will be much damaged if we are really deprived of our opinions about other societies, because these provide the range of comparison, the spectrum of alternatives against which we set what we want to understand.

            Moral isolationism would lay down a general ban on moral reasoning. This is the programme of immoralism and it carries a distressing logical difficulty. The author mentioned also that, immoralists like Niewtzsche are actually just a rather specialized sect of moralist. They cannot afford to put moralizing out of business than smugglers can afford to abolish customer regulations. The power of moral judgement for Mary is in fact not a luxury not a perverse indulgence of the self-righteous. It is said to be a necessity.

            Real moral scepticism is said that can lead only to inaction. Isolating barriers simply cannot arise here. The author also said that if we accept something as a serious moral truth about one culture, we can’t refuse to apply it. However, to other cultures as well, wherever circumstance admit it. If we refuse to do this, we just are not taking the other culture seriously.

            The universal predicament has been obscured by the fact that anthropologists used to concentrate largely on very small and remote cultures, which did not seem to have this problem.  The author mentioned also that if there were really an isolating barrier our own culture could never have been formed. The moral isolationist’s picture of separate, unmixable cultures is quite unreal.